

Globalization and Global Governance: Four Paradigmatic Views

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Abstract

Any adequate analysis of global governance necessarily requires fundamental understanding of the worldviews underlying the views expressed with respect to the nature and role of global governance. This paper starts with the premise that any worldview can be associated with one of the four basic paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. It argues that any view expressed with respect to global governance is based on one of the four paradigms or worldviews. It, therefore, discusses four views expressed with respect to the nature and role of global governance. The paper emphasizes that the four views expressed are equally scientific and informative; they look at the nature and role of global governance from a certain paradigmatic viewpoint. Emphasizing this example in the area of global governance, the paper concludes that there are opportunities for each paradigm to benefit from contributions coming from the other three paradigms if they respect paradigm diversity.

Keywords: global governance, functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, radical structuralist

JEL Classification Codes: B40, F02

I. INTRODUCTION

An analysis of global governance necessarily requires a fundamental understanding of worldviews underlying views expressed with respect to the nature and role of global governance. Four general views, corresponding to four broad worldviews, are discussed. These four views are equally scientific and informative; each looks at the nature of global governance and its role from a certain paradigmatic viewpoint.

The paper takes the case of global governance as an example and emphasizes that, in general, any phenomenon may be seen and analyzed from different viewpoints and that each viewpoint exposes a certain aspect of the phenomenon under consideration. Collectively, they provide a much broader and deeper understanding of the phenomenon. Therefore, each academic field can benefit much from contributions coming from other paradigms if it respects paradigm diversity.


Ardalan (2007a, 2007b) respectively show how each of the four paradigms views and analyzes corporate governance and markets differently and therefore how each

one of them can benefit from the insights of the other three paradigms. For instance, as a sub-discipline of economics, mainstream finance does not concern itself with social structure. This paper proposes that the consideration of social structure is one way to improve the insight into the multi-faceted issues in finance.

Any adequate analysis of the role of paradigms in social theory must recognize the assumptions that underwrite that paradigm or worldview. Social theory can usefully be conceived in terms of four key paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. The four paradigms are founded upon different views of the social world. Each generates theories, concepts, and analytical tools which are different from those of other paradigms. The four paradigms are based on different assumptions about the nature of social science (i.e., the subjective-objective dimension), and the nature of society (i.e., the dimension of regulation-radical change), as in Exhibit 1.¹ This can be used as both a classificatory device, or more importantly, as an analytical tool.

Exhibit 1: The Four Paradigms

Each paradigm adheres to a set of fundamental assumptions about the nature of science (i.e., the subjective-objective dimension), and the nature of society (i.e., the dimension of regulation-radical change).



The paper is organized as follows. Sections II to V, first, each lays down the foundation by discussing one of the four paradigms. Subsequently, each section presents the nature and role of global governance from the point of view of the respective paradigm. Section VI discusses the benefits of paradigm diversity. Section VII concludes the paper.

II. THE FUNCTIONALIST PARADIGM

In Exhibit 1, the functionalist paradigm occupies the lower right quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From right to left they are: Objectivism, Social System Theory, Integrative Theory, Interactionism, and Social Action Theory.

The functionalist paradigm assumes that society has a concrete existence and follows certain order. These assumptions lead to the existence of an objective and value-free social science which can produce true explanatory and predictive knowledge of the reality out there. It assumes that scientific theories can be assessed objectively by reference to empirical evidence. Scientists do not see any roles for themselves within the phenomenon which they analyze through the rigor and technique of the scientific method. It attributes independence to the observer from the observed. That is, an ability to observe “what is” without affecting it. It assumes there are universal standards of science, which determine what constitutes an adequate explanation of what is observed. It assumes there are external rules and regulations governing the external world. The goal of scientists is to find the orders that prevail within that phenomenon.

The functionalist paradigm seeks rational explanations of social affairs and generates regulative sociology. It emphasizes understanding order, equilibrium and stability in society and the way in which these can be maintained. Science provides the basis for structuring and ordering the social world, similar to the structure and order in

the natural world. The methods of natural science are used to generate explanations of the social world. Their approach to social science is rooted in the tradition of positivism.

Functionalists are individualists. The properties of the aggregate are determined by the properties of its units. The functionalist paradigm has become dominant in academic sociology and mainstream academic finance. The world of finance is treated as a place of concrete reality, the individual is regarded as taking on a passive role; his or her behavior is being determined by the economic environment. Functionalist paradigm's views with respect to the nature and role of global governance are presented next.²

Democracy is a system of government in which the people choose their leaders at regular intervals through free, fair, and competitive elections. Democratization has expanded dramatically in the world. It promotes political transformation, freedom, the rule of law, and good government. The full global triumph of democracy is not yet attained, but it has never been more attainable. Democracy will continue its worldwide expansion if the process of global economic integration and growth is sustained and if freedom is made a priority in international diplomacy, aid, and other engagements.

Can every country become a democracy? The answer is a cautiously optimistic one. The current world order is in many respects without historical precedent. This is due to the unparalleled superiority of military and economic power of the United States to any conceivable combination of competitors or adversaries. Additional facts are as follows:

1. This superior global power is held by a liberal democracy.
2. The next highest global power is held by a loose union of countries that are also all liberal democracies.
3. The majority of states in the world fall in the category of democracy.
4. The only model of governance in the world with broad normative appeal and legitimacy is democracy.
5. There is a worldwide legal and moral recognition of democracy as a basic human right of all peoples.

6. States and international organizations are ever more variously intruding on sovereignty in order to promote democracy and freedom.

In short, the international context has been playing an increasingly important and favorable role in the growth of democracy. At this historical epoch, the cooperation among powerful democracies combined with a visionary and resourceful strategy can essentially eliminate authoritarian rule over the next generation or two.

The third wave of global democratization began in April 1974, when the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown in a military coup and half a century of quasi-fascist rule was ended. The triumph of democracy in Portugal marked the beginning of a long wave of worldwide democratic expansion that continues to this day.

There is great depth and breadth of the third wave of democratization. In 1974, there were 41 democracies out of 150 states. Of the remaining 109 states, 56 states (i.e., more than half of them) subsequently made a transition to democracy; and of the 56 states, only Pakistan, Sudan, and Russia are not democracies today. Moreover, 26 states since 1974 have gained independence of colonial rule; 15 of them became democracies upon independence and have remained democracies since; and another 6 have become democracies after a period of authoritarian rule. Of the 19 new post-communist states, 11 states (i.e., 58 percent of them) are democracies. Of the 45 new states created after the start of the third wave, almost three-quarters (more specifically, 71 percent) are democracies, though in the case of the states in former Soviet Union, some of them (e.g., Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia) are not clearly democratic.

After democracy spread to Eastern Europe, to a few states in the former Soviet Union, to some states in Africa, and to several states in Asia and Latin America, it became a global phenomenon during the 1990s. Now, it is the predominant form of government, and the only broadly legitimate form of government in the world. Today, about three-fifths of all states (121 of 193, according to Freedom House) are democracies. Democracy has no global rivals. Communism is dead. Military rule lacks appeal and normative justification. Most one-party states have disappeared. In the age of democracy, single-party states cannot credibly claim the ultimate wisdom and moral

righteousness to rule indefinitely, without facing criticism or challenge. Islamic states have provided only a vague model with some moral and ideological appeal as an alternative form of government. However, it is only for a small portion of the world's societies. Moreover, the only actual example of such an Islamic state is the Islamic Republic in Iran, which is increasingly corrupt, discredited, and illegitimate, and its people overwhelmingly desire a more truly democratic form of government.

It is now easier for states to become democratic because most states already are. Almost all states that became democratic during the third wave have remained so, including countries that lack some of the "required" conditions for democracy. Excepting pre-1990 Africa, only four democracies have been overthrown by military coups. Two of them (Turkey and Thailand) returned to democracy fairly quickly; and the other two (Pakistan and the Gambia) have been forced to institute civilian multiparty elections. Although several democracies have been suspended by elected civilian leaders, only 14 of the 125 democracies that have existed during the third wave have become authoritarian, and in 9 of these, democracy has since been restored.

Democracy has emerged and persisted in an extremely poor, landlocked, Muslim country like Mali, in which the majority of adults are illiterate, live in absolute poverty, and where life expectancy is 44 years. There can be no reason why democracy cannot develop in most other very poor countries as well. Indeed, out of the 36 countries the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) classifies as having "Low Human Development," 11 are democracies. If the scope of comparison is widened to include the bottom third of states classified by the UNDP, democracies rise from nearly a third to 41 percent. About a dozen have been democracies for at least one decade. It is important to note there are so many democracies among the world's least developed countries and that there is an overall predominance of democracy in the world.

Democracy has not covered all regions of the whole world. Except for one region, in all the regions of the world at least a third of the states are democracies. In Latin

America and the Caribbean, 30 of the 33 states are democracies, and almost half of them are now fairly liberal in terms of their levels of freedom. In the former communist countries, two-thirds are democracies. In Asia, half of the states are democracies. In Africa, about two-fifths of states are democracies. Only in the Middle East democracy is absent. None of the 16 Arab countries is a democracy, and, with the exception of Lebanon, they have never been.

In terms of the trends in freedom, every region of the world has experienced a fairly significant improvement in the level of freedom – except for one. Even regions that had been under the long-term rule of authoritarian regimes have seen improvement. Only in the Middle East the average level of freedom has declined. This situation is not related to Islam. There are 43 countries in the world with a clear Muslim majority. A quarter (i.e., seven of the 27) of non-Arab, Muslim-majority states is democracies. Moreover, non-Arab Muslim countries have a considerable cumulative experience with political freedom over the last 30 years.

Democracy exists in all types of states. It significantly prevails in almost every region of the world. It is present in countries with every major religious or philosophical tradition: Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Muslim. It is much well-received by developed countries (the top 20 countries in human development are all liberal democracies). It is also significantly present among very poor countries. It is much more common – and much more liberal – in small states with a population of less 1 million. Most of the biggest countries are democracies – i.e., 8 of the 11 countries with populations over 100 million. Only the Arab countries are undemocratic.

Democracy as a universal value prevails in every major region of the world and therefore it is almost a universal phenomenon. The richer a country the greater is its chance to sustain democracy. There is a striking monotonic relationship between the development level of a country and the probability that it sustains democracy. For the poor countries, democracy is not a luxury but a necessity. Democracies do not experience famines. People in economic need ought to have a political voice. Democracy is not a luxury that should be postponed until the arrival of general

prosperity. Poor people favor democracy. There have been many cases where poor people have mobilized passionately for democratic change and its defense.

Data from public opinion surveys show that democracy is understood and valued widely across cultures. Surveys show that Muslims prefer democracy as much as non-Muslims do. It seems that Islam has less influence on political attitudes than is frequently thought. In fact, individuals with the strongest Islamic beliefs are not necessarily less supportive of democracy than others. Significantly, Arab thinkers, scholars, and civil society activists are challenging lack of democracy and freedom in the Arab world. They realize that it undermines human development and it is one of the results of slow political development.

There is growing evidence that democracy is becoming a truly universal value. This is not because democracy has the consent of everyone, but because people everywhere see it as valuable. Democratizing the entire world is too bold an endeavor. Major democracies need to work with and through international partners and institutions in order to energize, transform, and democratize global structures.

The fully global triumph of democracy has not been attained. However, it has never been more attainable. Democracy will continue its worldwide expansion if the process of global economic integration and growth is sustained and in addition freedom is made an important priority in international diplomacy, aid, and other engagements. History has proven that democracy is the best form of government. Over time, more and more countries will become democratic while fewer go back to dictatorship. If major democracies retain their power, reshape their strategy, and sustain their commitment, eventually – certainly by mid-century – every country in the world can be democratic.

III. THE INTERPRETIVE PARADIGM

In Exhibit 1, the interpretive paradigm occupies the lower left quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum.

From left to right they are: Solipsism, Phenomenology, Phenomenological Sociology, and Hermeneutics.

The interpretive paradigm sees the social world as a process created by individuals. Social reality, insofar as it exists outside the consciousness of any individual, is regarded as being a network of assumptions and intersubjectively shared meanings. This assumption leads to the belief that there are shared multiple realities which are sustained and changed. Researchers recognize their role within the phenomenon under investigation. The goal of interpretive researchers is to find the orders that prevail within the phenomenon under consideration; however, they are not objective.

The interpretive paradigm believes that in cultural sciences, the subject matter is spiritual in nature. In the cultural sphere, human beings are perceived as free. An understanding of their lives and actions can be obtained by the intuition of the total wholes. Cultural phenomena are seen as the external manifestations of inner experience. The cultural sciences, therefore, need to apply analytical methods based on “understanding;” through which the scientist can seek to understand human beings, their minds, and their feelings, and the way these are expressed in their outward actions.

The interpretive paradigm believes that scientific knowledge is socially constructed and socially sustained; its significance and meaning can only be understood within its immediate social context. Interpretive finance research enables scientists to examine aggregate market behavior together with ethical, cultural, political, and social issues. The interpretive paradigm believes that there are no universally valid rules of finance and financial management. Interpretive paradigm’s views with respect to the nature and role of global governance are presented next.³

The interdependence of states has increased, but only to about what it was in the year 1910 if measured by the amount of trade or capital flows as a percentage of GNP; and it would be lower if measured by the mobility of labor; and yet lower still if measured by the mutual military dependence of states. Money markets may be the only truly global economic sector. However, international movement of financial assets is very

similar to international movement of commodities, i.e., the present situation is similar to what it was in the past. Despite today's high speed communication, financial markets at the turn of the previous century were at least as integrated as today. Closer interdependence has effects on the conduct of internal and external affairs of nations.

Globalization is the fad of the recent decades and it is made in America. This is because much of the world has been left unnoticed: most of Africa and Latin America, Russia, all of the Middle East except Israel, and large parts of Asia. Moreover, various regions of many countries participate in the global economy to varying degrees. For instance, northern Italy is involved in global activities much more than southern Italy. In general, globalization is not global because it is mainly limited to the north.

The world is not homogeneous. Unfortunately, there are wide disparities between the North and the South. There are considerable and persistent differences even among countries which are claimed to be in the zone of globalization. For example, financial patterns are quite different across countries. The United States needs to import capital, but Western Europe does not, and Japan exports capital. The more closely countries are compared the more variations are found. This is not surprising. What seems smooth, uniform, and simple from a distance, upon closer scrutiny proves to be pock marked, variegated, and complex. In a competitive system the losers imitate the winners, otherwise they continue to lose. In political as in economic development, newly-independent countries imitate the practices and the institutions of the countries that they consider advanced. Every once in a while, a country invents a new way, or modifies an old way to gain an advantage over other countries; and then the process of imitation begins anew. In general, in a competitive system there are winners and losers: A few do exceptionally well, some just make it, and many fall behind. In the past 75 years a variety of impressive political-economic systems were admired in their day.

Economic processes do not direct or determine a nation's policies. For instance, within the European community, which consists of advanced countries at similar levels

of development that are closely interrelated, forms of corporate governance fall within a spectrum of approaches and are expected to persist for the foreseeable future. Germany and France have economically grown more closely together as they have become each other's principal trading partners since the 1950s. Yet, France has copied German policies but has been unwilling or unable to copy its institutions.

Economies remain local to a large extent. Countries with large economies continue to do most of their business internally. Developed countries do most of their non-oil external business with each other, which means their dependence on developing countries is further reduced. The world is less interdependent than is usually thought.

Major corporations are firmly anchored in their home country. None of the world's 100 largest corporations could be called truly "global" or "footloose." The importance of a corporation's home base is evident on all important respects: location of most assets, site of research and development, ownership, and management. And the technological expertise of corporations closely corresponds to that of their base countries.

States' adaptability is the key to their success in the world economy. Those states have considerable advantage that adapt easily to the current rapid technological and economic changes. International politics remains inter-national. Global or world politics has not dominated national politics. The twentieth century was the century of the nation-state. The twenty-first century will remain so. Trade and technology do not determine how best to organize a polity and its economy. National systems are highly resilient. States continue to have a wide range of choices. Over time, the qualities of the state that define success vary. One wonders what qualities define the next successful state.

States also protect themselves. Different nations, having distinct institutions and traditions, protect themselves differently. Japan fosters industries, defends them, and manages its trade. Alternatively, the United States uses its political, economic, and military leverage to protect itself, and manipulates international events to promote its interests.

A state's internal monopoly control over society and economy has never been complete, but it seems to be at its highest currently, especially in well-established

states. The range of governmental activities has rarely been longer than it is now. In many countries, the concern has been not with the state's diminished internal powers but with their increase, although state's control has decreased somewhat recently.

Economic markets and economic interests cannot play the role of government. For integration, there is a need for a government to protect, direct, and control. In contrast to integration, interdependence is the mere mutualism of states. The most important events in international politics are due to differences in the capabilities of states, rather than being due to economic forces that are operating either across states or transcending them. The world-shaking events of 1989-91 were due to a political event: the failure of one of the world's two great powers. If the configuration of international politics had not fundamentally changed, neither the unification of Germany nor the war against Saddam Hussein would have been possible.

National politics play a major role in international-political events. National politics, not international markets, underlie many international economic developments. Internationally, blocs have increasingly become more common. Economic interests and market forces do not create blocs, but governments do. Decisions and acts of a state or decisions and acts of a group of states arriving at political agreements shape international political and economic institutions. Governments regulate international economic matters much more than they did in the earlier era of interdependence. Before World War I, foreign-ministry officials were known for their lack of knowledge of, or interest in, economic affairs. As a result of governments' increased activities in economic affairs both at home and abroad, interdependence has become less of an autonomous force in international politics.

States are differentiated from one another primarily by capability. The major larger states have been growing more rapidly and have been getting richer while poor countries have remained poor. In a system with no central governance, the states with greater capability enjoy disproportionately larger influence due to lack of constraining

laws and institutions. These states are able to manipulate the system to their advantage. Those states succeed that use their capacity to adjust to external conditions and use their ability to take advantage of their economic leverage for political advantage. The United States, for the past several decades has remained highly important in the international economy – serving both as a major importer and exporter of goods and services – yet it has maintained a low degree of dependency on others. Due to its low dependency on others, the United States has a wide variety of policy options; and has the ability both to place pressure on others and to assist them.

The international economy, similarly to national economies, operates within a framework of rules and institutions. Rules and institutions are made, sustained, and perpetuated. Britain, to a large extent, played this role prior to World War I; no one took this role between the two world wars, and the United States has played such a role since World War II. That is, more than any other state, the United States both makes and maintains the set of rules and institutions that shape international political economy.

The United States is the world's most important country economically; and the most important and decisive militarily. The world is sustained by American power and America's use of that power against those who threaten its worldwide interests. The "invisible" hand of the market never works without an effective fist. The United States' military expenditures are greater than the next six or seven big spenders combined. When force is needed, only the leadership of the United States settles the matter. The Cold War militarized international politics. International relations were defined in terms of military. National security decision making in some democracies was penetrated by the United States.

Ironically, the end of the Cold War has further raised the importance of the American military. Other countries have reduced their military budgets more than the United States. This has heightened the military dominance of the United States. The stronger states have many more choices in coping with their adversities than the weak have, and the latter depend on the former much more than the other way around. The United States is the only country that can manage and lead a military coalition. Some states

participate, partly under pressure from the strong and partly under pressure from their needs to the strong. For instance, Western European countries and Japan are more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than the United States, and Western European countries are more affected by events in Eastern Europe than the United States is.

American foreign policy increasingly relies on military means. America continues to maintain its military presence in much of the world, and to look for ways to expand its troops in foreign countries, rather than ways to withdraw them because the Cold War has ended. In America, the Treasury Department and the Defense Department make as much or more foreign policy than the State Department does.

IV. THE RADICAL HUMANIST PARADIGM

In Exhibit 1, the radical humanist paradigm occupies the northwest quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From left to right they are: Solipsism, French Existentialism, Anarchistic Individualism, and Critical Theory.

The radical humanist paradigm assumes that reality is socially created and sustained. It provides critiques of the status quo. It tends to view society as anti-human. It views the process of reality creation as feeding back on itself; such that individuals and society are prevented from reaching their highest possible potential. That is, the consciousness of human beings is dominated by the ideological superstructures of the social system, which results in their alienation or false consciousness. This, in turn, prevents true human fulfillment. The social theorist regards the orders that prevail in the society as instruments of ideological domination. The major concern for theorists is with the way such ideological domination occurs and finding ways in which human beings can release themselves. They seek to change the social world through a change in consciousness.

Radical humanists believe that everything must be grasped as a whole, because the whole dominates the parts in an all-embracing sense. Moreover, truth is historically specific, relative to a given set of circumstances, so that one should not search for generalizations for the laws of motion of societies.

The focus of the radical humanists upon the “superstructural” aspects of society reflects their attempt to emphasize the Hegelian dialectics. It is through the dialectic that the objective and subjective aspects of social life interact. The superstructure of society is believed to be the medium through which the consciousness of human beings is controlled and molded to fit the requirements of the social formation as a whole. The radical humanists emphasize the political and repressive nature of purposive rationality, logic of science, positive functions of technology, and neutrality of language. The radical humanist paradigm’s views regarding the nature and role of global governance are presented next.⁴

Since the 1960s, rapid technological progress has accelerated global flows of capital, labor, information, and knowledge. These shifts not only internationalize but also integrate economic activities. Major developments include a drastic increase in capital mobility, a changing hierarchy of national units, and the emergence of major regional powers – most importantly the Asia Pacific zone, the European Union, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – as sources of political strength and economic vitality. Globalizing patterns add new complexity to international relations, because they transcend, blur, and even redefine territorial boundaries.

However, the compression of time and space has a limit because flows of capital and technology eventually reach distinct places. The combination of globalizing trends, national initiatives, and informal networks, has made new places – such as a few world cities (New York, London, Tokyo, etc.) and newly industrializing countries – important nodes in the present global political economy. People in some of these places tend to demand democratization as a means to gain control of the unaccountable forces of economic globalization. In general, there have been diverse responses to globalization: at one extreme, some have unconditionally accommodated globalization and planned

strategies for managing its currents; and at the other extreme, some have outright resisted globalization, often in the form of the invention and assertion of particularistic identities. States, international organizations, corporations, and social forces, have been trying to regain control and convert the threats of globalization into unparalleled opportunities.

Globalization is both an objective and a subjective phenomenon. It is not an entirely novel process, and may be regarded as a stage in the history of the development of capital, which has gathered many different societies in one system. This single configuration was developed based on some pre-conditions that included the long-distance trade and the emergence of nation-states. One of the characteristics of this Westphalian interstate system has been the rise and decline of periodic hegemonic orders. The last hegemonic order was the *Pax Americana*, which prevailed from the end of World War II to the early 1970s, which is marked by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The weaker U.S. position in the world economy, made it subject to the challenges of Europe and Japan. The United States was the largest debtor nation. Since no military power can be infinitely financed by external credit, the U.S. lost a substantial measure of its strength.

With the emergence of a post-hegemonic order, a series of structural changes began to take place in the global political economy in a period known as globalization. These changes include not only an intensification of the existing patterns – e.g., from cross-national lending to the hyper-mobility of finance capital – but also a fundamental transformation to a system that lacks a stable power with effective means of regulation. That is, globalization constitutes dialectic of continuities and discontinuities.

Globalization is also a movement of capital with deeper commodified forms of political and social integration. Globalization not only involves a large number of globalizing firms, but also the centralizing tendencies of the most powerful corporations based in select cities equipped with the social and economic infrastructure to enhance

global control, and connected to a spatially dispersed economic activity. Globalization involves economic concentrations and the denationalization of economic activities.

In the current era of globalization, production can be transferred overseas to defeat competitors, and reduce impediments to free movement of people and ideas. To counter the forces of nationalism and localism, globalization is equipped with the ideology of neo-liberalism. Globalization embodies values of economic liberalism: the inevitability of market utopia. It portrays ideal conditions that have never existed and certainly not without state regulation of the economy. Globalization as an ideology extols efficiency of free markets; and offers an open world economy in which participants compete in a positive-sum game, i.e., all participants gain. In this competitive model, the appropriate corporate strategy is crafted to maximize profits and market share to meet the requirements of globalization. However, the liberal-economic restructuring of globalization had led to the widening of social and economic disparities which is apparent both within countries and between them.

In general, ideologies not only involve myths to justify a social and political order, but also form social consensus and thereby lessen the state's use of coercion. One myth about globalization is that it is teleological – i.e., it has a predetermined logic with a final state of affairs: a global village, a worldwide economy, a world government, etc. However, even if globalization involves a set of deep historical structures, since history has no end, its course must be taken by intervention of human agency. A closely-related myth is to reify globalization as an inevitable trend: a juggernaut moving into the future. This is clearly in contrast to the multiplicity of forms encountered in diverse contexts, i.e., the way that the centralizing elements of globalization interact with distinctive local and regional conditions.

With the growing concentration of unaccountable economic power at the world level, regulatory frameworks are only partly able to control global flows, and the state is engaged in internal restructuring, realigning the scope of and hierarchy among economic ministries, enhancing outward-oriented agencies active in trade or finance, and diminishing welfare activities. The state is adopting policies to adjust to and

manage the globalization process in diverse ways. Old-fashioned national development planning – based on the assumptions that states are autonomous and leaders can determine their destinies – has been replaced by globalization projects. Globalization also involves a changing hierarchy among states.

The global restructuring of production and power is a crucial piece of globalization. The global restructuring of production has accentuated the imports of labor to the advanced capitalist countries. Although the transfers of population are mostly from the South to the North, movements within either area are significant.

The free global economy has increased trade in harmful substances with limited regulation. Ecological problems become more challenging when barriers fall in the globalized economy. With expansion of markets and the fall of socialist regimes, a new stratum of crime bosses, often with the approval of government officials, is developing. Transnational criminal groups are heavily involved in car theft, trade in nuclear materials, smuggling of migrants, arms deals, money laundering, and sales of human organs. To counter them, the interstate system seeks new means of coordination and cooperation, but the distrust among rival actors, variations in criminal codes, and insistence on protecting national sovereignty form the obstacles to their fight against the global organized crime.

Globalization is mostly about opportunities arising from reorganizing governance, the economy, and culture in the world. It threatens, but does not dissolve, the Westphalian interstate system, and opens up possibilities for political participation at non-state levels. It can liberate people (e.g., women drawn out from seclusion in the home and into the industrial workforce) as well as displace the constraining values in their lives. The technological patterns can release people from repetitive jobs and provide opportunities for new career paths and cultural discovery.

Globalization tries to resolve conflict between different operative logics, generating two major contradictions. First, centralizing activities grow in a territorially-based

context. A globalizing economy coexists with a territorial mode of political organization. There is incompatibility between a horizontal system of economic relations – speeded by technological advancements that escape regulatory regimes – and vertical units of the Westphalian framework, i.e., nation-states. Second, there is the mounting pressure for increased democratization at the national level that regards civic power as a means to limit state power, curbing abuses and corruption, and ensuring accountability. Yet global concentrations of economic power are remote and difficult to control.

There are four reactions to these problems. One is acceptance of globalization. Some very poor states have adopted this policy on the ground there is no alternative. Many other developing countries have embraced liberal-economic globalization, seeking to take advantage of opportunities it provides to the national advantage.

The second reaction is to arrange a multilateral response to challenges globalization poses on their sovereignty by cross-border flows. The UN provides a solution because it preserves the principle of sovereignty; and it constitutionalizes, harmonizes, and stabilizes the international system, although imperfectly. The UN also reflects the notion a world of states is desirable and its affiliates, international financial institutions, manage the global market. Proposals for institutional reform seek smooth execution of the neoliberal project.

The third reaction is for corporations to define niches, shift to new production methods, upgrade their technologies, use state initiatives, and create competitive advantage. Some of the business strategies have succeeded brilliantly and turned a threat into an advantage.

The fourth response is to contest the logic of the globalization process. Two alternative approaches are as follows. The right proposes fascism or hyper-nationalism. Some other movements promote autonomous and strong civil societies. They aim to construct an identity which is denied to them in a globalizing world.

The first three responses accommodate globalization, whereas the fourth one mounts counter-movements and plans for its eventual downfall. The first three advocate neo-liberal globalization, whereas the fourth one advocates democratic globalization.

V. THE RADICAL STRUCTURALIST PARADIGM

In Exhibit 1, the radical structuralist paradigm occupies the northeast quadrant. Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-subjective continuum. From right to left they are: Russian Social Theory, Conflict Theory, and Contemporary Mediterranean Marxism.

The radical structuralist paradigm assumes that reality is objective and concrete. It uses scientific methods to find the order that prevails in the phenomenon. It views society as a potentially dominating force. This paradigm is based on four central notions. First, there is the notion of totality, i.e., the phenomenon as a whole. This notion emphasizes that the totality shapes and is present in all its constituent parts. Second, there is the notion of structure. The focus is upon the configurations of social relationships, called structures. The third notion is that of contradiction. Structures, or social formations, contain contradictory and antagonistic relationships within them which act as seeds of their own decay. The fourth notion is that of crisis. Contradictions within a given totality reach a point at which they can no longer be contained. The resulting political and economic crises indicate the point of transformation from one totality to another, in which one set of structures is replaced by another of a fundamentally different nature.

To survive and reproduce themselves, human beings transform reality, where material reality is the most important. This transformation takes place through the social division of labor. This division implies social groups enter into relations with each other to produce, while using means of production, that is, they enter into production relations. These groups, formed in terms of production relations, are called social classes. A complete definition of a social class encompasses economic, political, and ideological elements, with dialectical relationships. Production relations, under capitalism, are

antagonistic, since they unite two antagonistic poles, defined as owner and non-owner. Therefore, social classes, who are the carriers of contradictory aspects of social relations, are antagonistic too.

Transforming material requires knowledge of doing it. Gaining knowledge of doing it requires dealing with it, i.e., transforming it. This is the materialist basis of epistemology, i.e., science has a materialist nature. Therefore, only classes, identifiable in terms of production relations, have the objective possibility of an independent knowledge of reality. Furthermore, the class which deals with a larger portion of reality, has the greater objective possibility of gaining a correct knowledge of it. Under capitalism, the proletariat,⁵ which deals with an increasing portion of social reality, has the objective possibility of knowing it correctly. In the context of the constant attempt that classes make to dominate each other, it can only realize itself through ideological class struggle. Knowledge is, thus, in the most fundamental sense, ideological, since it formulates views of reality and solves problems from a class point of view. Radical structuralist paradigm's views with respect to the nature and role of global governance are presented next.⁶

In recent decades the liberal cosmopolitan ideological current has gained prominence in the Anglo-American world. It runs parallel to the process of globalization and not only complements it, but also plays the more insistent role. Liberal cosmopolitanism is a radicalization of the Anglo-American tradition known as liberal internationalism, which believes in a single human race, peacefully united by free trade and common legal norms, and run by states that advocate civic liberties and representative institutions. Such liberal internationalism aimed at creating a global order with a code of conduct among states within the Westphalian system, i.e., states have jurisdiction in their own territories.

Liberal cosmopolitanism aims at creating a global order that governs important political and economic aspects of internal and external behavior of states. It does not advocate world government to decide on vital international issues. Rather, it proposes a set of disciplinary regimes, i.e., global governance, that penetrate deep into the

economic, social, and political life of nation-states, and safeguards international flows of trade and finance. The state sovereignty is granted by the “international community”, and is partial and conditional, which can be withdrawn if a state fails to meet the domestic or foreign standards of behavior set by the requirements of liberal governance.

Major shifts in ideologies are always responses to changes in the real world. The new liberal cosmopolitanism is a case in point. It has arisen in response to a host of new pressures on the internal affairs of weaker states, and new relationships among stronger ones. After the Cold War, Western powers have found it easier to end client dictatorships, and constitute liberal democracy as a common value, which is to be upheld in all parts of the world. Accordingly, domestic economic relations and property rights have been slowly realigned in terms of the directives of the IMF, WTO, or regional powers. Peripheral states, which fall outside the rich core, have been enthusiastically ready to make such internal changes. The collapse of the USSR has reinforced the cooperation among western countries, which is referred to as the “Pacific Union”. For instance, it has led to the military alliance in the Gulf War, and in the attack on Yugoslavia. Alternatively, it has led to the substantial increase in the UN military missions involving the major western powers.

The new liberal cosmopolitanism claims members of the “Pacific Union” have broken with power politics as their governing principle. In contrast, the central fact of contemporary international relations is that for the first time in history one country, i.e., the United States, has gained absolute military dominance over every other state or combination of states on the planet. Moreover, the US government has shown no sign of retreat in its global dominance. American defense spending is increasing. Pacific Union involves a set of bilateral, hub-and-spokes military alliances under US leadership. Although liberalism and democracy are now said to be prevailing norms, and the Warsaw Pact has disappeared, the US has worked vigorously to reorganize and expand these “defensive” alliances.

New liberal cosmopolitanism claims that the United States is no longer following egoistic national interest as its strategic guideline. In contrast, the actual policy guidelines for the US diplomacy show that they are wholly dedicated to the race for power politics. Moreover, wherever such documents refer to free trade and liberal democracy, they are conditions for the advancement of US power and prosperity.

The US geopolitical preponderance prevails in the whole of Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, parts of the Middle East, and Canada. The US is most firmly established in those areas that have the resource capacities to challenge US hegemony. These same areas have greater priority as the most important centers of capital accumulation or natural resources (most importantly petroleum). The rest of the planet is of little strategic interest to the US.

Although the United States and other Pacific Union governments publicly advocate the global spread of liberal rights and regimes, their policies are based on double standards. In those states that the US does not have any strategic interests, even real genocide is covered or sanctioned. However, in those other states that are pivotal to the US strategic interests, they are protected from human rights pressures.

The liberal cosmopolitan project for a new world order requires all states to conform to a supra-state planetary authority. The new liberal cosmopolitanism misrepresents the relationship between the US and various institutions of global governance that are either in place or are being formed, such as the IMF, the UN, and the WTO. Evidence suggests these institutions function effectively only to the extent their policies correspond to the priorities of the United States. These institutions should be viewed as disguised instruments of US policy.

There has been an asymmetrical pattern in state sovereignty. There has been a strong tendency towards erosion of sovereignty in most states in the international system, coupled with an accumulation of exceptional power for one state: the United States. There is a sharp distinction between members of the Pacific Union: the United States has not shown any tendency towards either abandoning power politics or subordinating itself to supra-state global authorities. Although norm-based

cosmopolitanism as an institutionalized order is not wanted in the US, it is enthusiastically wanted in Europe. However, under current world order, the EU propagates the US ideology of new liberal cosmopolitanism when dealing with other states by emphasizing on the free market, the rule of law, and democratic government; and by posing as guardian of universal liberal principles. On major issues, the EU has been acting as a regional subordinate of the US.

The new liberal cosmopolitanism claims the companies of Pacific Union states initiated economic globalization by escaping the control of their states. States continue to shape the patterns of international economic exchange by establishing the legal and institutional framework for the operation of markets.

The new liberal cosmopolitanism assumes that the regulatory and market-shaping efforts of states have been directed towards liberal free-trade regimes. In contrast, the evidence suggests that this is not the case. For instance, in the 1980s, the international economic policy of core countries deviated from the free-trade principles in sectors that were of crucial importance to economies outside the core – such as agricultural products, steel, textiles, and apparel – and in a number of other cases they moved towards managed trade and “reciprocity.” It exacerbates the existing huge debts, and makes peripheral governments increasingly desperate to access compensating inflows of capital from the core states. This pattern makes them vulnerable and unstable, and consequently incapable of providing sustained improvement in the well-being of their populations.

The majority of economic changes, described as “trade regimes” or “trade negotiations,” have been in relation to the property rights of foreign capitals in other states. As a consequence, they raised national public-policy concerns such as: the costs and benefits of allowing global oligopolies to obtain ownership of domestic assets and integrate them into their production and profit streams; of ending controls on the free movement of private finance; of privatizing (mainly into foreign ownership) domestic

social-service provisions and utilities; and of making domestic financial systems, and thereby entire national economies, highly vulnerable to sudden and massive moves in global monetary relations and in international financial markets.

Current changes in international trade and in the internal affairs of non-core political economies are very far from what new liberal cosmopolitanism has hoped for in terms of economic and social gains for the world's populations. The evidence points to an overwhelming huge and growing polarization of wealth between the majority of humanity and extremely wealthy small social groups within the core countries. The evidence also indicates there is almost no chance, if US allies within the Pacific Union were able to subordinate the US to a more collegial system, the existing pattern of economic relations would alter in any way. The US and its allies share a fundamental cause: their joint interest in perpetuating the drive for the control of new profit streams from non-core economies.

The new liberal cosmopolitanism confuses juridical forms with social substance. It views the world as a system of sovereign states on the one hand, and a proliferating number of regional, international, and global regimes and institutions on the other. Among these institutional patterns, it perceives a growing group of individuals who are becoming increasingly free to maximize their welfare in markets. Based on this juridical perspective, it hopes global regimes and institutions can embrace state sovereignties in a legally egalitarian, cosmopolitan rule of law in which all individuals in the world can unite in free exchange. When this same international order is viewed from the vantage point of social power, the reality is a highly centralized hierarchical pyramid of capitalist market forces which is dominated by the Pacific Union states and strongly supported by their state officials. There is substantial unity among market forces and the states of the core countries, rather than the antagonism suggested by new liberal cosmopolitanism. There is also substantial unity among societies of the Pacific Union, whose empire is guarded not by any supra-state institutions, but by a single hegemon, i.e., the USA.

The present international system is organized around American hegemony, not around a balance of power. International institutions serve American interests.

International security arrangements are mainly a collection of American-led alliances. What Americans call international “norms” are mere reflections of American and West European principles: Since the current benevolent circumstances are the product of our hegemony, reduction in hegemony will let others play a larger part in shaping the world to suit their needs, therefore, American hegemony must be actively maintained, just as it was actively obtained. US power will not come to an end unless it is actively detained. No system for universal harmony, however long-term, is credible if it sidesteps it.

VI. PARADIGM DIVERSITY

We briefly discussed four paradigms (as is summarized in Exhibit 2) and their views with respect to the nature and role of global governance (as is summarized in Exhibit 3).

Exhibit 2: Comparisons of the Four Paradigms

| | | Functionalist | Interpretive | Radical Humanist | Radical Structuralist |
|--------------------------|--------------|--|--|--|--|
| Nature of Science | Ontology | Phenomena are objective and external to the individual | Phenomena are subjective and are the product of individual's mind | Phenomena are subjective and are the product of individual's mind | Phenomena are objective and external to the individual |
| | Epistemology | Knowledge has to be acquired and science is value-free | Knowledge has to be personally experienced and science is value-laden | Knowledge has to be personally experienced and science is historical | Knowledge has to be acquired and science is class-specific |
| | Human Nature | Humans are the product of their environment and are viewed as individuals | Humans are the creators of their environment and are viewed in their socially-determined relationships with other humans | Humans are the creators of their environment and are viewed as dominating other humans through society's ideological superstructure | Humans are the product of their environment and are viewed as members of antagonistic classes |
| | Methodology | The social world is real hard and external to the individual. One needs to find the universal relationships among elements of the phenomenon | The social world is soft, personal, and subjective. One needs to understand the way the individual creates, modifies, and interprets the situation experienced | The social world is soft, personal, and subjective. One needs to understand the way the individual creates, modifies, and interprets the situation experienced | The social world is real hard and external to the individual. One needs to find the universal relationships among elements of the phenomenon |
| Nature of Society | | Society has unity and cohesiveness | Society has unity and cohesiveness | Society has deep-seated conflicts and modes of domination | Society has deep-seated structural contradictions |

Exhibit 3: Comparisons of the Implications of the Four Paradigms for Global Governance

| | | Functionalist | Interpretive | Radical Humanist | Radical Structuralist |
|--------------------------|-------------------|--|---|--|--|
| Global Governance | Its Driving Force | Advances in technology, communication, and transportation | States and multinational corporations | Advances in technology, communication, and transportation; States and multinational corporations; and Ideology | Exploitative logic of capital accumulation |
| | Its Operation | Based on free markets, where states act as independent entities to enhance smooth functioning of markets | States structure international economic relations, i.e., whether globalization should occur and to what extent | International economic relations are negotiated among states, multinational corporations, transnational capital, non-governmental institutions, and international institutions | Based on capitalism, where states and international institutions act as the agents of the corporations |
| | Its Role | Globalization of markets benefits everyone | Current internationalization of economic activity is limited to certain national economies such that the gap between the North and the South has been growing | Economic globalization has benefitted some people and harmed others | Globalization of capitalism is the globalization of exploitation and has created global inequalities |

The diversity of theories presented in this paper is vast. While each paradigm advocates a research strategy that is logically coherent, in terms of underlying

assumptions, these vary from paradigm to paradigm. The phenomenon to be researched is conceptualized and studied in many different ways, each generating distinctive kinds of insight and understanding. There are many different ways of studying the same social phenomenon, and given the insights generated by any one approach are at best partial and incomplete,⁷ the social researcher can gain much by reflecting on the nature and merits of different approaches before engaging in a particular mode of research practice.

The ancient parable of six blind scholars with the elephant illustrates the benefits of paradigm diversity. There were six blind scholars who did not know what the elephant looked like and had never even heard its name. They decided to obtain a mental picture, i.e., knowledge, by touching the animal. The first blind scholar felt the elephant's trunk and argued the elephant was like a lively snake. The second blind scholar rubbed along one of the elephant's enormous legs and likened the animal to a rough column of massive proportions. The third blind scholar took hold of the elephant's tail and insisted the elephant resembled a large, flexible brush. The fourth blind scholar felt the elephant's sharp tusk and declared it to be like a great spear. The fifth blind scholar examined the elephant's waving ear and was convinced the animal was some sort of a fan. The sixth blind scholar, who was between the elephant's front and hind legs, could not touch any parts of the elephant and consequently asserted that there were no such beasts as elephant at all and accused his colleagues of making up fantastic stories about non-existing things. Each of the six blind scholars held firmly to their understanding of an elephant and argued and fought about which story contained the correct understanding of the elephant. Their entire community was torn apart, and suspicion and distrust became the order of the day.

This parable contains many valuable lessons. First, probably reality is too complex to be fully grasped by imperfect human beings. Second, although each person might correctly identify one aspect of reality, each may incorrectly attempt to reduce the entire phenomenon to their own partial and narrow experience. Third, the maintenance of communal peace and harmony might be worth much more than stubbornly clinging to

one's understanding of the world. Fourth, it might be wise for each person to return to reality and exchange positions with others to better appreciate the whole of the reality.⁸

All theories are based on a philosophy of science and a theory of society. Many theorists appear to be unaware of, or ignore, the assumptions underlying these philosophies. They emphasize only some aspects of the phenomenon and ignore others. Unless they bring out the basic philosophical assumptions of the theories, their analysis can be misleading; since by emphasizing differences between theories, they imply diversity in approach. While there appear to be different kinds of theory, they are founded on a certain philosophy, worldview, or paradigm. This becomes evident when these theories are related to the wider background of social theory.

In order to understand a new paradigm, theorists should explore it from within, since the concepts in one paradigm cannot easily be interpreted in terms of those of another. The four paradigms are of paramount importance to any scientist, because the process of learning about a favored paradigm is also the process of learning what that paradigm is not. The knowledge of paradigms makes scientists aware of the boundaries within which they approach their subject.

Scientists often approach their subject from a frame of reference based upon assumptions that are taken-for-granted. Since these assumptions are continually affirmed and reinforced, they remain not only unquestioned, but also beyond conscious awareness. The partial nature of this view only becomes apparent when the researcher exposes basic assumptions to the challenge of alternative ways of seeing, and starts to appreciate these alternatives in their own terms.

Researchers can gain much by exploiting the new perspectives coming from the other paradigms. An understanding of different paradigms leads to a better understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the phenomenon researched. Although a researcher may decide to conduct research from the point of view of a certain paradigm,

an understanding of the nature of other paradigms leads to a better understanding of what one is doing.

The plea for paradigm diversity is based on the idea that more than one theoretical construction can be placed upon a given collection of data. In other words, any single theory, research method, or particular empirical study is incapable of explaining the nature of reality in all of its complexities.

It is possible to establish exact solutions to problems, i.e., truth, if one defines the boundary and domain of reality, i.e., reductionism. For instance, functionalist research, through its research approach, defines an area in which objectivity and truth can be found. Any change in the research approach, or any change in the area of applicability, would tend to result in the break-down of such objectivity and truth. The knowledge generated through functionalist research relates to certain aspects of the phenomenon under consideration. Recognition of the existence of the phenomenon beyond that dictated by the research approach, results in the recognition of the limitations of the knowledge generated within the confines of that approach.

There is no unique evaluative perspective for assessing knowledge generated by different research approaches. Therefore, it becomes necessary to get beyond the idea that knowledge is foundational and can be evaluated in an absolute way. Researchers are encouraged to explore what is possible by identifying untapped possibilities. By comparing a favored research approach in relation to others, the nature, strengths, and limitations of the favored approach become evident. By understanding what others do, researchers are able to understand what they are not doing. This leads to the development and refinement of the favored research approach. The concern is not about deciding which research approach is best, or with substituting one for another. The concern is about the merits of diversity, which seeks to enrich research rather than constrain it, through a search for an optimum way of doing diverse research. The number of ways of generating new knowledge is bounded only by the ingenuity of researchers in inventing new approaches.

Different research approaches provide different interpretations of a phenomenon, and understand the phenomenon in a particular way. Some may be supporting a traditional view, others saying something new. In this way, knowledge is treated as being tentative rather than absolute.

All research approaches have something to contribute. Interaction among them may lead to synthesis, compromise, consensus, transformation, polarization, completion, or simply clarification and improved understanding of differences. Such interaction, based on differences of viewpoints, is not concerned with reaching consensus or an end point establishing a foundational truth. On the contrary, it is concerned with learning from the process itself, and encouraging the interaction to continue so long as disagreement lasts. Likewise, it is not concerned with producing uniformity, but promoting improved diversity.

The functionalist paradigm regards research as a technical activity and depersonalizes the research process. It removes responsibility from the researcher and reduces him or her to an agent engaged in what the institutionalized research demands. Paradigm diversity reorients the role of the researchers and places responsibility for the conduct and consequences of research directly with them. Researchers examine the nature of their activity to choose an appropriate approach and develop a capacity to observe and question what they are doing, and take responsibility for making intelligent choices which are open to realize the many potential types of knowledge.

It is interesting to note that this recommendation is consistent, in certain respects, with the four paradigms: (1) It increases efficiency in research: This is because, diversity in the research approach prevents or delays reaching the point of diminishing marginal return. Therefore, the recommendation is consistent with the functionalist paradigm, which emphasizes purposive rationality and the benefit of diversification. (2) It advocates diversity in research approach: This is consistent with the interpretive paradigm, which emphasizes shared multiple realities. (3) It leads to the realization of

researchers' full potentials: This is consistent with the radical humanist paradigm, which emphasizes human beings' emancipation from the structures which limit their potential for development. (4) It enhances class awareness: This is consistent with the radical structuralist paradigm, which emphasizes class struggle.

VII. CONCLUSION

This paper briefly discussed four views expressed with respect to global governance. The functionalist paradigm views global governance as universal liberal democracy, the interpretive paradigm views global governance as historically specific, the radical humanist paradigm views global governance as multifaceted and multilayered, and the radical structuralist paradigm views global governance as class determined.

Knowledge of Economics and Finance, or any other field of the social sciences ultimately is a product of the researcher's paradigmatic approach to the multifaceted phenomena he studies. Viewed from this angle, the pursuit of social science is seen as much an ethical, moral, ideological, and political activity as a technical one. Since no single perspective can capture all, researchers should gain more from paradigm diversity.

NOTES

¹ See Burrell and Morgan (1979).

² For this literature see Diamond (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2008), Doyle (1983, 1999), Frederick (1993), Fukuyama (1992), Haas (1958, 1964, 1990), Haas and Schumpeter (1964), Held and McGrew (2002c), Karatnycky (1999), Kindleberger (1969), Long (1995), Mitrany (1943), Ohmae (1990), Reinecke (1997), and Schumpeter (1976). This section is based on Diamond (2003).

³ For this literature see Brown (1995), Carr (1981), Gilpin (1981), Held and McGrew (2002c), Hirst (2001), Hirst and Thompson (1999), Huntington (1993), Keohane (1986, 1990, 1998), Keohane and Nye (1977), Krasner (1983, 1995), Low (1997), McNeill (1977), Morgenthau (1948), Spiro (1999), Waltz (1979, 1999), Weiss (1998), and Wolf (1999). This section is based on Waltz (1999).

⁴ For this literature see Archibugi (1995), Archibugi and Held (1995), Archibugi, Held, and Kohler (1998), Bobbio (1988), Burnheim (1985, 1986), Connolly (1991), Cox (1993, 1996b, 1997b, 1999), Deudney (1998), Dryzek (1990, 1995, 2000), Ekins (1992), Falk (1992, 1995a, 1995c, 1999), Gill (1995, 1996, 1997b, 1998), Held (1987, 1991, 1993b, 1995c, 1995d, 1999), Held and McGrew (2002c), Held et al (1999), Hobsbawm (1994), Kant (1795), Korten (1995), Linklater (1996), McGrew (1997, 2002), Mittelman (1996c), Murphy (2005b), Patomaki (2000), Robinson (1996a, 1996b), Rosenau (1997), Rosenberg (1994), Sakamoto (1997), Sandel (1996), Shaw (1994), Sklair (2001), Thompson, D. (1999), and Walker (1988, 1991). This section is based on Mittelman (1996c).

- ⁵ The proletariat is defined as all the individuals who participate in the transformation of material, i.e., in the transformation of the social product, while not owning the means necessary for this transformation.
- ⁶ For this literature see Brunheim (1985, 1986, 1995), Callinicos, Rees, Harman, and Haynes (1994), Dryzek (1995), Duffield (2001), Falk (1969, 1987), Gowan (2001), Held (1987), Held and McGrew (2002c), Scholte (2000), Walker (1988), and Wallerstein (1974b, 1979b, 1984, 1991a). This section is based on Gowan (2001).
- ⁷ For instance, the academic fields of Economics and Finance limit their perspective to the functionalist paradigm. On this matter see Ardalan (2008).
- ⁸ This parable is taken from Steger (2002).

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